National Missile Defence and India – Social Issue Essay, Article for Class 12, Graduation and Competitive Examination.

Essay on “National Missile Defence and India” 

When governments adopt a particular course of action, rationalisation and justifications offered by them and their acolytes must be separated from the more accurate and deeper analysis of why such a course has been adopted. This is particularly vital when considering the US decision to go ahead with its National Missile Defence (NMD) plans, as well as the Indian Government’s decision to be reluctant and unhappy European and Canadian NATO allies.

The shift from an earlier more forthright opposition to the NMD to a much ‘soter’ even somewhat ‘welcoming’ lines from this Government and so many in the Indians bomb lobby was predicted. This shift is now being rationalised as follows: (a) There really is no Indian shift in official policy. (b) The US shift from an ‘offensive’ nuclear strategy to a ‘defensive’ one contains many positive possibilities for the global nuclear order which should now be explored before passing judgment. (c) Chinese reactions to the NMD will not create problems for India. (d) India can benefit from participation with the US in such defence shield plans, especially if a South Asian Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system is also being considered.

Before dissecting these four rationalizations the basic reason behind the Indian shift should be grasped. It is fairly obvious. India and the world would both be much better off if the US did not proceed along the NMD/ TMD path. That is why India first opposed the NMD. But since no one can stop the US which has decided to go ahead anyway, the only choices for Indian foreign opposition (either strongly or more mildly) or to endorse the action (directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, cautiously or more enthusiastically).

To adopt some variation of the first means taking a principled position and fighting for it regardless of prospects of success. It means recognising and being appalled that warning is now being given for the future nuclearization and militarisation of inner and over space and that this is a completely new direction that global nuclear competition will take. It means condemning this profound new turn in the global nuclear situation which will greatly increase nuclear tension, hostilities, dangers and rivalries and which deeply damages current and future prospects for moving towards global nuclear disarmament. It means recognising that US reasons for embarking on this project (which incidentally is much more ambitious than not just the Democrats’ ‘Son of Stars Wars’ programme but also goes far beyond the Region Star Wars programme) have very little to do with its ostensible justifications – namely protecting the US from potential nuclear attack or blackmail by certain ‘rouge states’, or with wanting to protect the US from an accidental launch, or with ‘defending’ the US mainland.

It is in fact a deeply offensive strategy aimed at giving the US the confidence that it can even ‘win’ a nuclear war. Having a comprehensive shield would give it a huge pre-emptive first-strike potential and ‘advantage’ compared to other nuclear states since even a non-optimal functioning missile shield can be expected to cope with whatever remains of a rival second-strike (even with decoy and diversion systems to fool the missile shield) so that possible damage to the US is either negligible or within ‘acceptable’ limits. Whether the NMD is ever able to achieve this technical capacity is an open question but the intention is clear. The wider purposes of the NMD include giving the US what is called in the jargon, “full spectrum dominance”, i.e., that the new technologies that would hopefully emerge would give the US dominance and control over the newest emerge would give the US dominance and control over the newest and most crucial battleground (even for conventional warfare) of space itself. The most important point to bear in mind about the NMD project is that it is the clearest and most unequivocal expression of the post-cold war desire of the US to not only permanently institutionalise its current status as the world’s supreme power but to make itself an effectively unchangeable power, at least militarily and nuclear, leaving behind forever the kind of ‘parity’ that it was forced to accept for a long period during the earlier cold war era.

To adopt some variation of the second position means surrendering before the most aggressively nationalist and imperialistic military-nuclear designs of the US because India simply cannot afford to alienate the US by its opposition a desperately needs, in its presumed ‘national interest’ to be on to good side of the US. But since a straightforward acknowledgement of surrender (remember how a more independent Indian elite once upon a time used to mock the subservient reflexes of the US, European, Canadian and Japanese allies? It is too damaging to one self-image-especially since India is now supposed to be, after Pokhran II, a more independent-minded country- how much better it is to find other reasons for taking such a position and to convince oneself of their validity. But how valid are the four rationalisations that are being today and tomorrow?

No answer needs to be given to those who would deny any shift in India’s policy regarding the NMD. The proponents of the NMD deliberately trade on the apparent moderation that the idea of favouring ‘defence’ over ‘offence’ might arouse amongst an uninformed public. The basic justification given for why nuclear weapons could provide security in a competitive nuclear world relied on the principle of mutual deterrence through a ‘balance of terror’ caused by common vulnerability to each other’s weapons. Erecting defences tries to eliminate the vulnerability of the side that has these defences, thereby undermining the common vulnerability that kept the supposed balance in place. The shift to an NMD is not a shift from an offensive to a defensive and defensive system that greatly enhances the offensive capabilities of the side having the mix. Unilateral US reductions (though welcome) will still leave thousands of warheads intact and are no compensation whatsoever for the damage done by having an NMD.

Everybody recognises that an NMD will force China to enhance its efforts to overload a future US shield by creating decoy systems and developing a much stronger offensive capability. We are told, however, that this will be a Chinese reaction to the US not India so there will be no side-effects worsening the India-China nuclear face-off. After all, China has to develop missiles with the range to hit the US, not India. What world are our ‘experts’ living in? An NMD system will definitely be accompanied by regional TMD systems which will force China to develop missiles with a range that are ideal for hitting India. Moreover, the NMD will also force China to go in for moving its missiles something it has not done as yet and would not otherwise have done. It is unclear whether China can do this without explosive testing. If not, then a future Chinese retreat from the CIBT and tests are on, which opens up another nuclear Pandora’s Box. But even if no warhead-bomb tests are needed to reach India as for missiles capable of reaching the US.